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INTRODUCTION'
In the mid-nineties, the Editorial Board of the Netherlands Yearbook
of International Law decided to select the diversity in secondary rules
and the unity of international law as a topic to celebrate the Yearbook's
twenty-fifth anniversary. The focus was on sources, responsibility, coun-
termeasures, and dispute settlement, thus reflecting Hart's secondary
rules of recognition, change, and adjudication.
The question posed was whether "the way in which secondary rules
have been used or excluded, modified or put into operation unamended
* Karel Wellens graduated from the Law Faculty of the Catholic University of Leu-
yen in 1973. He was a junior lecturer at the University of Antwerp from 1973-79, where he
prepared and defended his Ph.D. on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. In
1980 Professor Wellens became Senior Lecturer in European Law in the Faculty of Law of the
University of Nijmegan, where he was later appointed Professor of Public International Law
and the Law of International Organizations. Prof. Wellens served as Co-Rapporteur on the ILA
Committee on Accountability of International Organizations from 1996-2004. He is now the
Chairman of the Advisory Committee on International Legal Issues to the Dutch Foreign Min-
istry.
1. This paper partly builds on an earlier publication of mine, KAREL WELLENS, REME-
DIES AGAINST INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS (2002), and on the efforts of the ILA
Committee on Accountability of International Organizations of which I have the honour to act
as one of the two Co-Rapporteurs. The Committee's Final Report was adopted at the Berlin
ILA Conference in August 2004.
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or unreservedly, by the numerous actors in various special fields, consti-
tute[s] a threat to the unity, coherence and efficacy of the overall
international legal order.' 2 The Editorial Board came to the conclusion
that the relative autonomy of a wide range of branches of international
law had guaranteed the growing effectiveness of their own particular set
of primary rules, without putting in jeopardy the unity and coherence of
the international legal order. Branches remain an integral part of general
international law also as far as their secondary rules are concerned.3
In his 1998 Hague Lectures, Jonathan Charney explored the question
"whether the coherence of international law was threatened by the in-
creasing number of third party forums that decide disputes in accordance
with international law."4 He concluded that cross-fertilization promotes
uniformity of the law and constitutes an improvement in the quality of
the law.' I do share Charney's belief that a large number of international
forums deciding questions of international law will strengthen the rule of
international law6 , as well as his conclusion that "an increase in the
number of international tribunals appears to pose no threat to the interna-
tional legal system.
7
The increasing role of International Organizations (1Os) on the in-
ternational scene is one of the factors contributing to the move of the
international legal system "away from its traditional status as the exclu-
sive realm of States," while the lack of structural unity' of the
international legal system inevitably also affects the law of 1Os.
The question arises whether the "common needs and the desire to
have a functioning legal system" apparently underpinning the "relative
coherence of the doctrines espoused by these tribunals"9 will also be
found when the respondents are 1Os and whether their separate account-
ability regime within which international and domestic tribunals operate
could justify variations that might occur in the future.' °
2. Karel Wellens, Diversity in Secondary Rules and the Unity of International Law:
Some Reflections on Current Trends, in DIVERSITY IN SECONDARY RULES AND THE UNITY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3, 27 (L.A.N.M. Barnhhorn & K.C. Wellens eds., 1995).
3. Id. at 28
4. Jonathan Chamey, Is International Law Threatened by Multiple Tribunals?, in 271
RECUEIL DES COURS, COLLECTED COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACADEMY OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW, 101, 115 (1998).
5. Id. at 130.
6. Id. at 135.
7. Id. at 347.
8. This paper was originally presented at a conference organized by the Michigan
Journal of International Law at the University of Michigan Law School. The conference was
entitled "Diversity or Cacophony?: New Sources of Norms in International Law," and it ad-
dressed the lack of structural unity of international law.
9. Chamey, supra note 4, at 350.
10. Id. at 352.
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I. REMEDIAL REGIME TOWARDS IOs:
SOME PARTICULAR FEATURES
The International Law Commission has pointed out that there is a
"widely perceived need to improve methods for settling" disputes about
the responsibility of international organizations." Remedies and other
means of redress when an 10 causes damage or fails to comply with ap-
plicable rules must be effective and adequate. Because of the essential
features of the judicial function, the remedial potential of judicial reme-
dies is crucial for the entire accountability regime. 2 By setting the course
towards a comprehensive accountability regime, the judiciary, both do-
mestic and international, could counterbalance any process towards
fragmentation in this area.
Hart rightfully considered the union of primary and secondary rules
to be one of the decisive constituent elements for any legal system. The
interplay of primary and secondary rules has an impact on the rules of
change, non-compliance, and adjudication. 3 The link between substan-
tive and remedial law with respect to IOs is still in its developmental
stages. The picture of primary rules applicable to 1Os has, however, in
recent years become less fragmented along the lines of the various
branches of international law.
The "functional necessity doctrine" has limited the constant widen-
ing of the range of such primary rules. It is also more generally
applicable than just with regard to their privileges and immunities before
domestic courts; the doctrine is "a restraining factor on the arguments
and mechanisms an 1O may invoke or turn to in order to limit, to render
more difficult-or impossible even-the mise-en-oeuvre of its account-
ability or to create a maze in the net of accountability for decisions or
acts or omissions which allegedly were not in conformity with the mul-
tiple, applicable yardsticks.' 4
II. U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at para. 478, U.N.Doc. A/57/10 (2002).
12. It may be noted in passing that the ILC Working Group on responsibility of IOs
considered it wise, given the complexity of the issues, "to leave open the question whether the
study should include matters regarding the implementation of responsibility of international
organisations." Id. at para. 485.
13. Wellens, supra note 2, at 31-34.
14. Karel Wellens, The Primary Model Rules of Accountability of International Organi-
zations: the Principles and Rules Governing the Conduct or the Yardsticks for Their
Accountability, in PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 434, 468 (Neils M.
Blokker & Henry G. Schermers eds., 2001).
Jan Klabbers has rightly pointed out the basic flaw of the doctrine: "it is almost by defi-
nition biased in favour of international organizations to the possible detriment of others."
Although "it may serve as a useful shorthand way of describing what people may have in
mind when granting privileges and immunities, and when assessing them," the problem
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The community interests an 10 is obliged to serve require the reme-
dial regime to reflect and to address both individual and societal
concerns and interests; consider, for example, the competing interests at
stake, in relation to requirements of the burden of proof and evidence,
and in calculating the amount of compensation to be paid, or when a
third party submits to an 10 a request for disciplinary action against one
of the IO's agents. NGOs duly accredited to the 10 should be able to
submit statements and observations during judicial proceedings to reflect
the irreplaceable role global civil society has to play in ensuring com-
munity interests are respected.
II. THE RIGHT TO A REMEDY
The principle of promoting justice, which is common to all 1Os,
covers both their internal and external accountability. The remedial re-
gime is subject to the imperative of the protection of human rights, of
which the right to adequate means of redress in case of violation is a ba-
sic standard, and which should always prevail over an 10's functional
needs. 5 The right to a remedy as a general principle of law and a norm
of customary international law 6 applies in all dealings between an 10
and other parties. This right includes both the procedural right of effec-
tive access to a fair hearing and the substantive right to a remedy; 7 both
elements serve as yardsticks to assess whether 1Os have complied with
their inherent duty to provide adequate, equivalent legal protection.'
The right of access to court is one of the fundamental human rights
which has become part of customary international law. 9 The absence of
adequate alternative methods of protection of non-state third parties
would not only constitute a structural gap under the evolving account-
resides "in the fact that this description has taken on normative dimensions." JAN KLABBERS,
AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW 152-153 (2002).
15. A.S. MULLER, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND THEIR HOST STATES: ASPECTS
OF THEIR LEGAL RELATIONSHIP 282 (1997).
16. DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 182 (1999).
17. Id., at 14-15. Procedural justice is an essential pre-condition for substantive justice.
See HANNS PETER NEHL, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN EC LAW 24 n.39
(1999).
18. In a major departure from existing structures of international law, alternative non-
judicial mechanisms such as an Ombudsman or an Inspection Panel put aside the sacrosanct
interference and intervention by a State as the vital precondition for any action at the interna-
tional level.
19. Christian Dominic6, Morgan v. World Bank (Ten Years Later), in LIBER AMICORUM
IBRAHIM F.I. SHIHATA: INTERNATIONAL FINANCE AND DEVELOPMENT LAW 155, 165 (Sabine
Schlemmer-Schulte & Ko-Yung Tung eds., 2001).
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ability regime, but it could easily amount to a denial of justice if com-
bined with a successful claim to jurisdictional immunity."
1Os operate at multiple levels and may face a variety of potential
claimants. A wide range of judicial bodies may be called upon to provide
adequate remedial protection and to implement accountability in differ-
ent ways. Yet, in this regard, it is important to recall that "no
international tribunal has compulsory jurisdiction over international or-
ganizations."'"
When the respondent is an 10, claimants are unlikely to engage in
forum shopping before "multiple tribunals, with different procedural
rules, different remedies, and possibly different results. 22 Their limited
(or completely lacking) locus standi and the restrictive jurisdiction of
competent tribunals are factors considerably reducing the risk of frag-
mentation of international law in this area.
On the other hand, as the "consistency [in case law] ultimately gives
coherence to international law' 23 more or less strong currents of "merg-
ing" tendencies that counterbalance any process of fragmentation can be
found, to varying degrees admittedly, in the role and caselaw of the In-
ternational Administrative Tribunals, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ), the European Court of Human Rights, the Courts of the European
Communities, and domestic courts.
III. INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNALS
The hierarchy of an 10's organizational structure is intended to guar-
antee internal accountability of all its agents towards the executive head
of the 10 for acts done in the exercise of their functions.2 ' There is an
20. Finn Seyersted, Settlement of Internal Disputes of Intergovernmental Organizations
by Internal and External Courts, in 24 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES
RECHT 1, 79 (1964). Failing an alternative procedure, "immunity must be set aside to avoid a
denial of justice." Dominic6, supra note 19, at 164 (commenting on the Waite and Kennedy,
and Beer and Regan cases before the ECtHR). See also Human Rights in the Administration of
Justice, G. A. Res. 56/161, U.N. GAOR 3rd Comm., U.N.Doc. A/RES/56/161 (Feb. 20, 2002)
("The right to justice as contained in applicable international human instruments forms an
important basis for strengthening the rule of law through the administration of justice.").
21. Michael Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organisations: Human
Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 53, 64 (1995).
22. See supra note 8.
23. Charney, supra note 4, at 360.
24. See UN Staff Regulation 1.3 (a); see also Bulletin on the Status, Basic Rights, and
Duties of U.N. Staff Members, U.N.Doc. ST/SBG/1998/19. Non-legal mechanisms to ensure
internal accountability include the Office of Internal Oversight Services, the Board of Audi-
tors, and the Joint Inspection Unit. In 2002 an Ombudsman was appointed by the Secretary-
General to consider a conflict of any nature related to employment by the UN and to
strengthen the informal mediation process. In the course of their investigation into the
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apparent deficiency, however, in the provision of mechanisms for ascer-
taining whether officials of an 10 are acting within the parameters
provided by the rules of the 10.25 A direct action before an International
Administrative Tribunal (IAT) against an official for not having per-
formed his functions is impossible and thus a review of their
accountability can only arise as a secondary issue. 6
As an 1O cannot impose civil or criminal sanctions against its em-
ployees and disciplinary measures are limited to employment and career-
related ones, IATs should be empowered to judge cases against staff
members and then their judgments could be enforced through national
courts .
The internal consistency of the United Nations Administrative Tri-
bunal's (UNAT) jurisprudence may well be enhanced by the new Article
8 of its Statute allowing the three members of the tribunal sitting in any
particular case raising a significant question of law to refer it for consid-
eration by the whole tribunal.
In June 2002 the Joint Inspection Unit (JIU) issued a report entitled
Reform of the Administration of Justice in the United Nations system:
Options for Higher Recourse Instances. 29 The 1995 decision to eliminate
the recourse against UNAT decisions before the ICJ suppressed "the only
existing remedy against any possible flaws in the decisions of the Tribu-
nal."30
The JIU Inspectors expressed the view that "the absence of a second
level of judicial authority should be remedied"'" and suggested that "a
higher instance with competence in a limited number of clearly-defined
cases should be established over the United Nations system as a
administration of justice within the UN system, Inspectors of the Joint Inspection Unit have
nevertheless "identified large substantive and procedural lacunae in law which may allow the
organizations to evade the worst consequences of improper decisions by their officials." Re-
form of the Administration of Justice in the UN System: Options for Higher Recourse
Instances, Report of the Joint Inspection Unit, U.N.Doc. JIU/REP/2002/5, page V (June 2002)
[hereinafter "JIU Report"].
25. N. White & D. Akande, Internal Working Paper of the ILA Committee on Account-
ability of International Organisations (on file with the author).
26. Id.
27. Paul C. Szasz, Disciplining International Officials, in TREATY ENFORCEMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN CRIMINAL MATTERS 190-91 (Rodrigo Yepes-Rodriguez &
Lisa Tabassi eds., 2002). Szasz's proposal was limited to cases of frauds or embezzlements,
but its scope could be expanded to include violations of other applicable "rules of the organi-
zation". Id.
28. G.A. Res. 55/159, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex, art. 8, U.N.Doc. AIRES/55/159
(2001). The availability of a case digest of UNAT judgments is another practical measure to
help judges and practitioners, including Staff Councils.
29. JIU Report, supra note 24.
30. Id. at VII.
31. Id. at recommendation 3.
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whole."32 The inspectors proposed an ad hoc panel that could be respon-
sible for reviewing the judgments of the two existing tribunals inter alia
on the basis that the tribunal has substantially deviated from its jurispru-
dence.33 The response from within the UN system was negative, and the
UN failed to implement the suggested changes.
On "a recommendation of the legal advisers of the United Nations
system, the UN Chief Executives Board (CEB) decided in 2001 not to
pursue the introduction of a second-tier appellate mechanism."' 3 CEB
members also questioned the appropriateness of the last criterion pro-
posed by the JIU: "such a new basis would suggest adherence to a
principle of justice that would make previous decisions automatically
binding in future cases and might impede the Tribunal from deviating or
appearing to deviate from earlier jurisprudence where such deviation
might be justified for a variety of legitimate reasons."35
The UNAT did not support the JIU recommendation either; not only
did "current procedures adequately protect staff members and afford
them full justice and consideration of their claims" but creating an addi-
tional judicial body could contribute to the further proliferation of
international judicial bodies that could impact negatively the unity of
international law.36 The tribunal, sitting en banc as a plenary body, could
consider significant questions of law and moreover, the UNAT reasoned,
the tribunal is itself, in effect, a court of appeal from lower-level quasi-
judicial bodies. 7
The JIU pointed out that the modern demands of "good governance"
seem to require efforts "to harmonize, if not actually unify, the rules and
procedures governing relations between employers and staff throughout
the international administration."38 Harmonization of the statutes and
working procedures, with special emphasis on their competencies, juris-
dictions, and case laws, could pave the way to an eventual merger of the
two Tribunals.39 In its Resolution 57/307 adopted on April 15, 2003, the
32. Id. at V
33. Id. at recommendation 5.
34. U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Addendum, Agenda items 119 and 123, at 6-7, U.N.Doc.
A/57/441/Add.1 (Jan. 31, 2003).
35. Id. at 7.
36. Letter dated 8 November 2002 from the President of the United Nations Administra-
tive Tribunal addressed to the Chairman of the Fifth Committee, U.N. GAOR 5th Comm.,
57th Sess., Annex, Agenda Item 123, at 2, 6-7, U.N.Doc. A/C.5/57/25.
37. Id. at 2-3.
38. JIU Report, supra note 24, at 1.
39. Id. at recommendation 3.
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UN General Assembly requested inter alia that the JIU to continue to
study the possibility of harmonizing the Statutes of the two tribunals. 
°
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
The ICJ fulfils a double role towards 1Os: it protects their general in-
terests vis-ez-vis particular interests of Member States, while also
performing a control over the observance by IOs of international legal
rules governing their activities
Article 34 of the court's statute, once described by Sir Robert
Yennings as "an extraordinary anomaly, 42 is a double-edged instrument
in terms of legal responsibility: the ICJ has no jurisdiction to hear dis-
putes brought by Member States against lOs, but neither can an 10
initiate proceedings against a recalcitrant Member State. 3
As lOs cannot be parties to a case before the ICJ, in appropriate cir-
cumstances, States have, at present, no option than to institute multiple
proceedings against all or a number of individual Member States in case
of alleged violations of international law by acts carried out by the 10
concerned. '
If the "reasons why international organisations do not have a locus
standi before the ICJ are more political than juridical" as Jessup put it in
19464 , then the accountability regime for 1Os seems to require that Arti-
40. G.A. Res. 57/307, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess., Agenda Item 123 at 3, U.N.Doc.
A/RES/57/307 (2003).
41. Terumi Furukawa, Le Double R6le de la Cour Internationale de Justice t l'Egard
des Organisations Internationals: Protection et Contrdle, in MKLANGES OFFERTS . PAUL
REUTER, LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL: UNITI ET DIVERSIT9 293 (1981).
42. Robert Y. Yennings, The United Nations at Fifty: The International Court of Justice
after Fifty Years, 89 AM. J. INT'L L., 493, 504 (1995).
43. One example of the inadequacy of this jurisdictional scheme is where the UN is
entitled to restitution as the result of non-compliance with Status of Force Agreements (SO-
FAs) or other agreements and as a result of which the 10 has incurred unforeseen financial
costs. Pursuant to a request made by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budget-
ary Questions, the Secretary-General, in January 2002, submitted a compendium of all those
instances. See Instances for which the United Nations is entitled to restitution as the result of
non-compliance with status-of-forces or other agreements, U.N.GAOR, 56th Sess., Agenda
Item 133, at 2 n.1, U.N.Doc. A/56/789 (2002) (stating the term "other agreements" should be
understood to include the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Na-
tions). Efforts to obtain reimbursement did include protests and notes verbales, but judicial
action could be resorted to as a final resort.
44. See, e.g., Legality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium); (Serbia
and Montenegro v. Canada); (Serbia and Montenegro v. France); (Serbia and Montenegro v.
Germany); (Serbia and Montenegro v. Italy); (Serbia and Montenegro v. Netherlands); (Serbia
and Montenegro v. Portugal); and (Serbia and Montenegro v. United Kingdom) (filed April 29,
1999), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions.htm (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
45. PHILIP JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 25 (1948).
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cle 34 be revisited." Direct remedial action against 1Os should become
available by widening access to the Court for 1Os through an amendment
of Article 34.
The need for direct access to the Court for 1Os both as an applicant
and respondent has been recognised by learned societies and scholars
since the 1950s, and, at one stage, by the US Department of State in its
1976 study.47
Alternatively, as the "idea underlying the system of binding advisory
opinions is to ensure a kind of unity in the case law of the International
Court of Justice,' ' s a "solution may be found along the lines of Section
24 of the Specialised Agencies Immunities Convention."49
lOs and States share the same systemic interests in abiding by obli-
gations of the international legal system. 0 The ICJ can "take into account
developments in international law across the entire spectrum of interna-
tional relations."'" Its case law "reflect[s] the perspective of a court
unrestricted by narrow limitations that a special regime may impose on a
forum,"52 thus providing a substantial advantage over the position of both
domestic courts and other international courts as regards an 10 remedial
regime.
V. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS
The exercise of international criminal jurisdiction vis-ai-vis individu-
als acting on behalf of an 10 and who are not exempted from such
jurisdiction under applicable rules and instruments may secure, in an
indirect way, accountability of the 10. Issues of accountability of an 10
may also arise, in an incidental way, when documents or information
disclosed to the tribunal shed light on the organization's conduct in par-
ticular circumstances. 3
46. See Karel Wellens, Accountability of International Organisations: Some Salient
Features, in AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW PROCEEDINGS 241, 244 (2003).
47. United States Department of State Study on Widening Access to the International
Court of Justice, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 187, 187-206, (1977).
48. Christian Dominicd, Request of Advisory Opinions in Contentious Cases?, in IN-
TERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT: TRENDS AND
PROSPECTS 91, 102 (Lawrence Boisson de Chazournes et al. eds., 2002).
49. Wellens, supra note 46, at 244.
50. Charney, supra note 4, at 367.
51. Id. at 362.
52. Id.
53. Information known to UN officials and experts by reason of their official position
shall not be disclosed without the authorisation of the UN Secretary-general. U.N. Staff Regu-
lation 1.2 (i).
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In the case of Todorovic before the International Criminal Court for
the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the defendant alleged that his capture and
transfer to The Hague had been the result of illegal conduct by the
NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR). The purpose of one of Todorovic's
motions before the Trial Chamber was "to secure certain information and
documents, which the accused believes to be in the custody and control
of SFOR, and which will assist him in his motions challenging the legal-
ity of his arrest. 54 The Trial Chamber ordered SFOR, the North Atlantic
Council and the thirty-three States participating in SFOR to provide To-
dorovic with the evidence requested. The ultimate result was "26 out of
the 27 of the charges against Todorovic being dismissed in return for him
renouncing his right to access SFOR information."5 The Trial Chamber
considered its power to issue binding orders on States also to extend to
SFOR through its responsible authority, the North Atlantic Council, and
dismissed SFOR's objections relating to its operational security. 6
In the Nikolic case, although the illegality of conduct committed by
SFOR in the process of his arrest was, following an agreement between
the parties, one of the questions to be established as a preliminary mat-
ter 7, the ICTY did not have to address the issue of attribution to SFOR
because Nikolic agreed, for the purposes of the motion, that his capture
had no connection to SFOR1
8
On June 5, 2003 the Appeals Chamber dismissed Nikolic's inter-
locutory appeal. It ruled that "even assuming that the conduct of the
accused's captors should have been attributed to SFOR and that SFOR
was responsible for a breach of human rights of the accused and/or
breach of the sovereignty of the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia],
there was no basis upon which the Appeals Chamber should decide to
refuse to exercise jurisdiction."59
As in "principle, there is no reason why Article 29 should not apply
to collective enterprises undertaken by States, in the framework of inter-
national organisations, ' 60 international criminal tribunals could play an
54. Prosecutor v. Todovoric, ICTY Case No. IT-95-9-PT, Decision on motion for judi-
cial assistance to be provided by SFOR and others, para. 59 (Oct. 18, 2000), available at
http://www.un.org/icty/simic/ trialc3/decision-e/01018EV513778.htm (last visited Oct. 13,
2004).
55. James Sloan, Prosecutor v. Todorovic: Illegal Capture as an Obstacle to the Exer-
cise of International Criminal Jurisdiction, 16 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 85, 93 (2003).
56. Id. at 94-96.
57. Id. at 109 n. 180.
58. Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, ICTY Case No. IT-94-2-PT, Decision on defence
motion challenging the Exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal (Oct. 9, 2002); see also James
Sloan, supra note 55, at 546 (2003).
59. Id. at 552 (emphasis in original).
60. Todovoric, supra note 58, at para.46.
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indirect role in establishing organizational responsibility. This does not
rule out that circumstantial evidence brought before such tribunals by
officials and agents of an 10 may subsequently be used, with all due cau-
tion, in proceedings against the 10 before other forums.
VI. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
The European Commission on Human Rights has stated the basic
position that still dominates the Strasbourg case law: "The transfer of
powers to an international organisation is not incompatible with the con-
vention provided that within that organisation fundamental rights will
receive an equivalent protection.'
The only case in which the problem of state responsibility for al-
leged human rights violations arising out of acts of an 10 was considered
in its merits was Matthews v. United Kingdom, where the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) recalled that "the [European Conven-
tion on Human Rights] does not exclude the transfer of competences to
international organisations provided that convention rights continue to be
secured." Therefore, Member States' responsibility "continues even after
such a transfer.
' 62
As IOs cannot as yet become parties to conventions on the protection
of human rights and thus become directly involved as respondents in the
existing judicial protection mechanisms, private claimants have, so far,
no other option than to submit their application against all individual
member states in case of infringement by conduct carried out by the
relevant 10.63 In this respect the situation of private claimants is analo-
gous to the position of States before the ICJ.
In their Application before the ECtHR against the Contracting Par-
ties also Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, applicants Bankovic and
others argued that the acts complained of "were taken under the direction
and authority of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)."64 The
61. M & Co. v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 1990 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. 46, 52
(Eur. Comm'n on H.R.).
62. Matthews v. United Kingdom, 123 I.L.R. 1, 13 at para. 32 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999); see
also Matthews v. the United Kingdom, 10 H.R. CASE DIGEST 23 (1999) (case summary).
63. DSR-Senator Lines, the second largest German shipping liner, filed its application
against all Member states "for the sake of certainty" although "it probably would have sufficed
to attack one of them." DSR-Senator Lines GmbH v. the Fifteen Member States of the Euro-
pean Union (Applicant's Memorial to the EctHR), 21 HUM. RTS. L.J. 112, at para. 51 (2000)
[hereinafter "DSR-Senator Lines Memorial"].
64. Bankovic and Others v. Contracting States also parties to the North Atlantic Treaty,
Application No. 52207/99, at para. 58 [hereinafter "Bankovic Application"]. The mere fact
that the EC is itself not a party to the European convention should not be a reason to declare
the application inadmissible. Id. at para. 82
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highest political authority of NATO, the Bankovic application alleged,
approved and directed these acts for which Member States were sever-
ally responsible.65
The structure of NATO "offers neither substantive nor procedural
protection for the fundamental human rights guaranteed under the Con-
vention."' In such situation, where the acts occurred in a non-State party,
"access to the convention organs provides the only opportunity for an
applicant to prevent and/or be compensated for the violation of his or her
rights., 67 This was further corroborated by the fact that there were "no
adequate or effective remedies available to the Applicants either in the
State of their residence or in Respondent States., 6' Although Respondent
Governments invoked the application of the ICJ's Monetary Gold rule,69
only France argued that the act was "not imputable to the respondent
States but to NATO, an organisation with an international legal personal-
ity separate from that of the respondent States."
7
In its Bankovic decision, the ECtHR only upheld the first ground of
inadmissibility, pertaining to the issue of a jurisdictional link between
the applicants and the respondent States. The ECtHR considered it un-
necessary to examine the remaining submissions on the admissibility,
which raised the thornier issue of whether the States could be severally
liable for their actions qua Member States to an IO."
In the Bosphorus Airways case, still pending, the Respondent State
argued that it was "simply acting as agent of the [European Community]
and, indirectly, of the UN" and that, referring to the Waite and Kennedy,
and Matthews judgments, it was "not contrary to the Convention for
States to join international organisations once those bodies provide hu-
man rights' protection equivalent to that of the Convention., 72 It
furthermore pointed out that the application had to be declared inadmis-
65. Id. at paras. 58-59, 61-62.
66. Id. at para. 74.
67. Id. at para. 88.
68. Id. at para. 103.
69. As consent is the basis for ICJ jurisdiction, the ICJ will not exercise jurisdiction in a
dispute between States which implicates a third State without that State's consent. In Mone-
tary Gold, the Court held that it could not hold proceedings in the absence of a State whose
legal interests would form the very subject matter of the decision. Monetary Gold (France v.
Italy), 1954 I.C.J. 19, 54 (June 15).
70. Bankovic and Others v. Belgium and Others, 2001-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 335, 345
paras. 31-32 (Dec. 12, 2001).
71. Id. at paras. 82 and 83.
72. Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Ireland, Decision as to the Admis-
sibility of Application No. 45036/98, part I.A. (Eur. Ct. H.R. September 13, 2001), available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int////tkpl97/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=285953B33D3AF948
93DC49EF6600CEBD49&key=6172&sessionld=630839&skin=hudoc-en&attachment=true
(last visited Oct. 13, 2004); see also Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve T7caret AS v. Ireland,
12 H.R. CASE DIGEST 993 (2001)(case summary).
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sible ratione personae because "international organisations have their
own separate legal personality and the court has no jurisdiction to hear
complaints directed against such an organisation or its competent or-
gans."73 Moreover, the applicant was "not challenging the acts, omissions
or legal provisions of an international organisation, but rather the appli-
cation of those legal provisions by the Irish State. 74
The court, unanimously declaring the application admissible, was of
the view that it did "not have sufficient information to enable it to make
a ruling (whether the impugned acts can be considered to fall within the
jurisdiction of the Irish State within the meaning of Article 1 of the Con-
vention). Furthermore, the issues are so closely bound up with the merits
of the case that is inappropriate to determine them at the present stage of
the proceedings.
'75
DSR-Senator Lines is the first one in which the accountability of the
EC's judicial bodies was raised before the ECtHR 6 In its Application
against the fifteen EU Members collectively concerning a matter of ex-
clusive Community competence-i.e. competition law-DSR-Senator
Lines submitted that the EC Commission and the European Community
judicial bodies-the Court of First Instance (CFI) and the European
Court of Justice (ECJ)-deprived it of its fundamental right to judicial
recourse by: (1) denying DSR-Senator Lines the suspensory effect of the
appeal before the CFI, and: (2) by imposing unreasonable and unfulfilla-
ble conditions.77
In foreclosing the possibility to obtain from a court a judgment in
the main case as to its culpability for the alleged infringement and to the
adequateness of the fine, the Communities (and through them their
Member States) have infringed the basic presumption of innocence of
73. Bosphorus, supra note 76, at 23.
74. Id; see also PJ.G. Kapteyn, The Role of the ECJ in Implementing Security Council
Resolutions, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS BY MEMBER STATES 57,
57-62 (Erika de Wet & Andre Nollkaemper eds., 2003); Pieter-Jan Kuijper, Implementation of
Binding Security Council Resolutions by the EUIEC, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
BY MEMBER STATES 39, 39-55.
75. Bosphorus, supra note 72, at 24.
76. On October 16, 2003 the President of the ECtHR decided to cancel the hearing in
the case in light of the CFI judgment delivered on September 30, 2003 that partly upheld pleas
alleging infringement of the applicant's fights of defense and annulled operative parts of the
contested decisions imposing a fine on DSR-Senator Lines and other companies concerned.
See Joined Cases T-191/98 and T-212/98 to T-214/98, Atlantic Containers Lines and Others v.
Commission (not yet reported), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat
/2004/c_007/c_00720040110en00290030.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
77. Since the Applicant "ha[d] shown its complete inability to obtain a bank guarantee
without jeopardising its existence:' it was argued that "the request for a bank guarantee is
disproportionate and de facto deprives the Applicant of access to justice." DSR-Senator Lines
Memorial, supra note 63, at para. 103.
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the Applicant until found guilty by a court, as well as the Applicant's
right to judicial recourse, rights of defense and right to a fair hearing.
The Applicant submitted: "in a case such as this, the ECtHR is com-
petent to rule on the compatibility of the decisions of the EC Institutions
with the ECtHR, the 15 EU Member States being collectively or indi-
vidually responsible for violations of the ECtHR by EC Institutions.
As soon as the standard set out by the ECtHR is not maintained anymore
by the ECJ, the ECtHR would be competent to rule on acts of EC Insti-
tutions. "There appears thus to be a general right to hold Member States
liable for acts of the EC Institutions infringing the provisions of the
ECtHR (including orders and judgments of the EC courts) whenever
necessary.' 79 The applicant rightly continued that otherwise "there would
be a major loophole in the system of protection of human rights which
would be widened daily with the progressive transfer of powers by
Member States to the European Union, or other similar international or-
ganisations" ' o
Faced with the straightjacket of the limits of its jurisdiction under
the Convention, the court in a number of cases where acts or omissions
of an 1O were among the issues the court had to decide in an incidental
way or as the very subject matter of the case before it, was able to de-
clare the application inadmissible on grounds that did not compel it to
make any pronouncement on the difficult question of the separate or
concurrent responsibility of the 10 involved.
The defensive stance by the court in the Bankovic case could be ex-
plained partly by the difficult and awkward admissibility question
"whether-and if so, which-contracting parties are responsible under
the convention for actions carried out within the framework of NATO.""1
DSR-Senator Lines raised the substantive question whether we can
"really hold member states responsible for the actions of organs, such as
the Commission and Court, over which they have no day-to-day con-
trol." 2
78. Id. at para. 38.
79. Id. at para. 39.
80. Id. at para. 48. On March 10, 2004, the Grand Chamber unanimously decided
against the admissibility of the application since the applicant company was unable to produce
reasonable and convincing evidence of the likelihood that a violation affecting it would occur.
See DSR-Senator Lines GmbH v. Fifteen Member States of the European Union, Decision as
to the admissibility of the application (Eur. Ct. H.R. Grand Chamber, 2004), at 13, available
at http://www.sbg.ac.atl oim/orig/04_2/SenatorEU ZE (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
81. Alexandra RUth & Mirja Trilsch, International Decisions, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 168,
172 (2003).
82. Andrew Clapham, The European Union before the European Court of Human
Rights, in BoISSON DE CHAZOURNES, supra note 48, at 73, 82.
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From the perspective of fragmentation of international law, it is
worth noting that the ECtHR described the Convention as "a constitu-
tional instrument of European public order (ordre public),"' 3 while the
Commission has underlined the peremptory character of the Conven-
tion's guarantees and the need for its safeguards to be practical and
effective.4 On the other hand, the ECtHR restated its pronouncement in
the Al-Adsani case that the Convention "should be interpreted as far as
possible in harmony with other principles of international law of which it
forms part."85 The ECtHR must determine state responsibility in confor-
mity with the governing principles of international law, "although it must
remain mindful of the Convention's special character as a human rights
treaty.
' 86
In its decision on the admissibility of the Bankovic application, the
Grand Chamber 7 not only continued its practice of cross references to
case law of other human rights bodies and courts, but, under the circum-
stances of the case, it took judicial notice of relevant proceedings
pending before other international tribunals, including the proceedings
instituted by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia against Belgium and
nine other NATO Member States before the ICJ and the June 2000 Re-
port of the Committee established to review Operation Allied Force
• • • 88
which led the ICTY Prosecutor's decision not to open an investigation.
From the point of view of the proliferation of international courts
and tribunals and their impact on the unity of the international legal sys-
tem, some have welcomed three recent ECtHR decisions involving
issues of state immunity as reassuring."
In a number of cases the ECtHR has been very cautious in taking
upon itself the role of a forerunner when having to touch upon central
questions of international law.9° Judge Ferrari Bravo, dissenting in
83. Loizidou v. Turkey, Judgment on Preliminary Injunction, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
at 27 (1995).
84. M & Co., 1990 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. at 52 (1990). It may be noted that in its
2001 A1-Adsani judgment, the ECtHR's majority, while acknowledging the peremptory nature
of the prohibition on torture, did not rely on the peremptory character of the Convention's
guarantees to let the right of access to court prevail over state immunity. See Al-Adsani v.
United Kingdom, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. 273 (2001).
85. Bankovic, supra note 70, at para. 57 (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. When a case raises a possibility of departure from the previous case law of the
ECTHR, relinquishment to the Grand Chamber, consisting of 19 judges, is obligatory.
88. Id. at paras. 12, 13.
89. See, e.g., Helene Tigroudja, La Cour Europ~enne des Droits de l'Homme et les
Immunits Jurisdictionnelles d'Etats, 34 REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 526, 544
(2001) (discussing the AI-Adsani, Fogarty, and McElhinney cases).
90. AI-Adsani, 34 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 294-297 (opinion by Judges Pellonpaa and Bratza,
concurring).
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Al-Adsani, rightly pointed out that "the Court has unfortunately missed a
very good opportunity to deliver a courageous judgment." 9' This assess-
ment certainly also applies to the ECHR's disposition of the Waite and
Kennedy and Beer and Regan92 cases involving jurisdictional immunity
of an 10 and where the assessment of the equivalence of the protection
to be provided by the 10 was prominent. The court merely referred to the
existence of remedies within the 1O without carrying out a proper and
thorough examination of the adequacy of those remedies-i.e., whether
in order to be effective, the remedies were "accessible, capable of pro-
viding redress in respect of the applicant's complaint and [did] offer
reasonable prospects of success."93 There is no inherent reason to apply
different standards when it comes to Os. Time has come also for the
ECtHR to realise that "le ddni de justice auquel aboutit 1'immunitd ne
peut plus 6tre toldr." 94
VII. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
An indication of intentional fragmentation of international law in the
area of passive accountability of 1Os may be found in the use by the EC
of exclusion clauses. The EC inserted such an exclusion clause on ques-
tions of interpretation of provisions which are substantially identical to
corresponding provisions of community law into the European Eco-
nomic Area Agreement providing for arbitration on certain disputes
concerning safeguard and re-balancing measures.9 The exclusion was
inserted to preserve "the autonomy of the Community legal order., 96
However, the ECJ did not object to the EU submitting itself to decisions
of international courts that do not apply mutatis mutandis the acquis
communautaire.1
7
91. Id. at 300-01.
92. In these cases, the Court considered the claim that a grant of immunity to an 1O
violated the applicants' right of free access to court under Article 6(1) of the Convention after
the applicants had been unsuccessful before German courts against the ESA. The ECtHR
considered the granting of immunity as serving a legitimate purpose since its purpose was to
ensure the proper functioning of 1Os. The ensuing limitation of the applicants' right of access
to court was not disproportionate because there existed alternative means of redress.
93. Bosphorus, supra note 72, at 25.
94. Isabelle Pingel, Droit d'Accs aux Tribunaux et Exception d'lmmuniti: la Cour de
Strasbourg Persiste, 106 REVUE GgNtRALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 893, 906
(2002).
95. Allan Rosas, The European Union and International Dispute Settlement, in BoIs-
SON DE CHAZOURNES, supra note 48, at 49, 54.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 55.
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With regard to fundamental rights, the "legal system of the European
Communities not only secures fundamental rights but also provides for
control of their observance." 98 The relationship between fundamental
human rights and community law has been succinctly and aptly de-
scribed by Advocate General Jacobs in the following terms: "Respect for
fundamental rights is ... a condition for the lawfulness of Community
acts ... [and] Community law cannot release Member States from their
obligations under the [European] Convention. '99
Accession by the EC to the Convention would allow the ECtHR to
adjudicate applications brought against the EC and there "would be no
legal loophole through which the community could slip to avoid having
its acts judged by an external body."'0° Within the Community legal or-
der, the ECJ and CH show a preference for legislative remedies in areas
such as compensation for innocent victims of sanctions imposed by the
UN and implemented by the EC. They do not seem inclined to close the
accountability gap left by the lack of careful scrutiny by political institu-
tions before their implementation.' °'
Fragmentation of the international legal system is maintained if not
enhanced when an 10 such as the EC is relying on its own courts to
solve disputes regarding human rights abuses by the EC, while "in the
field of international trade, the European Community is prepared to
submit to an independent international dispute mechanism such as the
one at the heart of the WTO,"'02 or, for that matter, to an ad hoc chamber
of ITLOS
03
VIII. DOMESTIC COURTS
The functional decision-making autonomy of 1Os is guaranteed and
protected by the mechanism of jurisdictional immunity before domestic
courts, to be "seen not as qualifying a substantive right but as a proce-
dural bar on the national court's power to determine the right."' 4
98. Bankovic Application, supra note 70, at para. 74.
99. Bosphorus, supra note 76 (quoting Advocate General Jacobs).
100. Clapham, supra note 82, at 87.
101. Kuijper, supra note 74, at 52-53, 55.
102. Clapham, supra note 82, at 88. The same argument may be used with regard to the
UN willing to have its immunity being protected by the ICJ under Section 30 of the General
Convention to which it is not a party either, by the 10's "principal judicial organ." Id.
103. See, e.g., Chile v. European Union, No.7 International Tribunal for the Law of the
Sea (December 2000) (Order).
104. McElhinney v. Ireland, 2001-XI, Eur. Ct. H.R. 37, 46 (2001).
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As far as the UN is concerned, the nature of their immunities is such
as to render them absolute.05 1Os interpret their immunity in a broad way
as covering protection from every form of legal process."
Notwithstanding the predominant absolutist interpretation of 10 im-
munity, various considerations underlie calls for a substantial reduction
of an 1O's jurisdictional immunity. The principle of fairness towards par-
ties dealing with an 10 and to other third parties seems to require a more
circumscribed immunity, in the same way as that principle underpins
restricted state immunity.'17
Judge Loucaides' view, dissenting in the McElhinney case on state
immunity before the ECtHR, that in "present democratic society an ab-
solute immunity from judicial proceedings appears to be an
anachronistic doctrine incompatible with the demands of justice and the
rule of law" also applies to immunity of 1Os: why indeed should an 10
not be accountable before domestic courts, for injury and damage in-
flicted by its agents on individuals or their property on the territory of
any of its member states? 0
Arguing that access to court belongs to jus cogens, Dominic6
pointed out that access should prevail over immunity if no legal remedy
is available. '°9 Others took the view that only particularly convincing rea-
sons could justify subordinating the principle of access to justice to 10
immunity," as "it can never be considered functionally necessary [for
lOs] to deprive parties dealing with [them] of all forms of judicial pro-
tection."'
Closing the accountability gap may come within the realm of "the
most compelling reasons""' 2 domestic courts may invoke to take a differ-
ent view from an executive head's determination of the functional
necessity of a particular act; it may also be one of the "public interests
considerations" that may outweigh the immunity's effect to prevent ac-
cess to court."3
105. 1984 U.N. JURID. Y.B. 188-189, U.N.Doc. ST/LEG/SER.C/22.
106. AUGUST REINISCH, INTERNATIONAL ORGANISATIONS BEFORE NATIONAL COURTS,
163-67 (2002).
107. Id. at 261-62.
108. McElhinney, supra note 104, at 55 (Loucaides, J., dissenting).
109. Dominicd, supra note 19, at 166.
110. Emmanuel Gaillard & Isabelle Pingel-Lenuzza, International Organisations and
Immunity from Jurisdiction: to Restrict or to Bypass?, 51 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 5 (2002)
(commenting on the Beer and Regan case in the ECtHR).
111. MULLER, supra note 15, at 271.
112. Difference Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a Special Rapporteur of the
Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion, 1999 I.C.J. 62, 87 (Apr. 29, 1999).
113. Fogarty v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 157-73 (Judge Loucaides, dis-
senting).
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The provision of adequate means of redress and remedies to guaran-
tee an 10's accountability vis-i -vis non-State third parties would meet its
obligation to provide appropriate modes of settlement in exchange for
granting it jurisdictional immunity before domestic courts.' 14
Because domestic judges do not hold "common conceptions of the
nature, role and importance of international law,"' 5 national courts deny-
ing jurisdictional immunity (in cases where their assessment of both the
availability and the adequacy of alternative settlement mechanisms
proved to be negative) may still be a long-term perspective. The fact re-
mains, however, that in the absence of such adequate alternative
remedial mechanisms, States may violate their human rights obligations
by granting immunity."
' 6
In the meantime the executive head of an 1O should, within the con-
text of Section 20 of the General Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the UN, waive the immunity if such a waiver is required
by the proper administration of justice and should follow a restrictive
interpretation of the situations where such waiver would prejudice the
interests of the 10.
Time has also come to emphasize that certain acts such as torture
and other gross violations of human rights or international humanitarian
law can never be considered to be part of the official function of an agent
of an 10."7 The immunity shield does of course not constitute an obsta-
cle to a criminal prosecution for a non-official act. To allow a criminal
proceeding to go forward, the act of the official "would have to be char-
acterised as a crime under national law." ',8 To allow a civil proceeding to
go forward, "it might be necessary to provide in a civil code that a viola-
tion of the [1O's] rules constitutes either a contractual or tortious
violation" and for other civil claimants (e.g., a damaged enterprise) "to
provide a cause of action based on violation of the [10's] rules."" 9 These
114. Wellens, supra note 46, at 245.
115. Charney, supra note 4, at 355.
116. Singer, supra note 21, at 91-95.
117. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 17,
1998, U.N.Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 37 I.L.M. 999 (entered into force July 1, 2002); see also Case
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002
I.C.J. 63, at para. 85 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergen-
thai).
118. Szasz, supra note 27, at 192.
119. Id. Individuals and companies identified by, for example, Panel of Experts to exam-
ine conflict trade or listed by a Sanctions Committee could be prime candidates to start a civil
action for damages caused, as their basic right to a fair hearing might have been violated. The
dilemma facing domestic courts has been explained earlier.
In DSR-Senator Lines, the EC Commission, acting under Rule 61 (3) of the Court Stat-
ute, submitted written observations, outlining the "interests of the organisation as such
(separate from the collective interest of the member states)." Clapham, supra note 82, at 84.
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rules inevitably and increasingly do comprise norms of international law,
incorporating human rights and international humanitarian law. A multi-
lateral treaty providing for criminalization of defined breaches of an 10's
rules by one of its agents and creating the possibility of civil remedies
against such officials by the 1Os as well as by states or individuals dam-
aged by such breaches would be a viable option."2o
IX. RECOURSE TO DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION?
States do not seem to assess the nature and effectiveness of systems
of control established within the material scope of international instru-
ments on the protection of human rights. This may partly explain a
decrease in the exercise of diplomatic protection between States.'2'
With regard to 1Os the opposite reasoning may be put forward: the
importance of the exercise of diplomatic protection by States towards
1Os may grow in the future because such assessment of the remedial re-
gimes put in place by 1Os is actually taking place. In a case of denial of
justice by the 10 resulting from the absence of equivalent legal protec-
tion, an injured person should be able to turn to his national state for
diplomatic protection, and also to fill the gap left by the recent jurispru-
dence of the ECtHR with regard to the mechanism of protection
available within 1Os themselves.
In this context, the lifting of the jurisdictional immunities of 1Os by
domestic courts may be considered to be an exercise of diplomatic pro-
The interesting aspect to be noted is that the preservation of the autonomy of the Community
legal order was invoked by the Commission to prevent systematic and unilateral scrutiny by
Member States of acts of the institutions in individual cases for compliance with the European
Convention on Human Rights in order to avoid condemnation by the Convention guardians.
See id. at 83-86; see also Case T-306/01 R, Aden and Others v. Council and Commission of
the European Communities, 2002 E.C.R. 11-2387 (2002) (decision of the President of the CFI
rejecting a request for provisional measures aiming at the suspension of the implementation of
a Regulation and the rescission of a list the European Commission had attached to it and
which was taken from a report of the UN Sanctions Committee established under Resolution
1333 after the claimants had failed to convince the Committee to lift the sanctions).
Within the World Bank, firms accused of fraud and corruption in the procurement and
execution of contracts financed out of loans may present their case to the President of the
Bank in case the Department of Institutional Integrity has recommended disqualification, but
there is no possibility of judicial review within the context of the Sanctions Committee. See
Andre Rigo Sureda, Process Integrity and Institutional Independence in International Organi-
sations: The Inspection Panel and the Sanctions Committee of the World Bank, in BoISSON DE
CHAZOURNES, supra note 48, 165, 191-192.
120. Szasz, supra note 27, at 192.
121. Jean-Francois Flauss, Protection Diplomatique et Protection Internationale des
Droits de l'Homme, 13 SCHWEIZERISCHE ZEITSCHRIFr FijR INTERNATIONALES UND Eu-
ROP ISCHES RECHT 1, 9 (2003).
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tection by the forum state.12  Diplomatic protection could be exercised
both towards the 10 and towards the forum state that has granted an 10
immunity of jurisdiction. 23
X. THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY: GENERAL PICTURE
The transfer of powers to an 1O cannot remove acts of the 10 from
the ambit of control mechanisms established by particular treaties; nei-
ther can it exclude the responsibility of the States who made such
transfer. 24 The problem of redress mechanisms in case of unlawful ac-
tion by lOs would not have to remain an "unsolved one,'' 125 if the
judiciary were to take a proactive stand. I strongly believe that the judi-
ciary has a vital role to play in closing the accountability gap and to
restore trust by making people and institutions more accountable.'26
As the Institut de Droit International pointed out in 1957, there
should "for every particular decision of an international organ or organi-
zation which involves private rights or interests.. be provided
appropriate procedures for settling by judicial or arbitral methods juridi-
cal differences which might arise from such a decision."'27 Moreover,
there is no inherent reason why remedial outcomes of restitution, dam-
ages, specific performance, satisfaction and injunctive relief, applicable
under the regime of state responsibility should not also become available
under the organizational responsibility regime.
The role of the judiciary is, however, an ambivalent one: while lack
of recourse to courts constitutes a serious gap in the accountability re-
gime for these main actors on the international scene, even the most
powerful executive organ on this planet-i.e, the U.N. Security Coun-
cil-has largely to rely on national administrations and courts for the
implementation of its policies and decisions. But domestic and interna-
tional courts, "through a system of enforceable judicial remedies,' 28 may
hold even the Security Council legally accountable, although the former
category of judges can only conduct a review of implementation meas-
ures that does "not meet the need of the targeted individual to be able to
122. See id. (regarding state immunity).
123. Id. at 12 n.22.
124. DSR-Senator Lines Memorial, supra note 63, at para. 46.
125. A. Reinisch, Governance Without Accountability?, 44 GERMAN Y.B. OF INT'L LAW
270, 286 (2001).
126. Onora O'Neill, A Question of Trust, The BBC Reith Lectures 2002 6 (2002).
127. INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, JUDICIAL REDRESS AGAINST THE DECISIONS
OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANS, at III(l) (1957), available at http://www.idi-
iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1957_amst_02_en.pdf (last visited Oct. 13, 2004).
128. CAROL HARLOW, ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 147 (2002).
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challenge the correctness of the decision taken by the Security Coun-
cil.'
129
By reviewing the compatibility of 1O resolutions with fundamental
human rights and refusing to apply them when violations are found,
Member States can still provide the necessary protection'3 ° and in the
process of doing so they may strengthen the consistency and the unity of
international law. Once a proper international mechanism exists, the le-
gal basis for such review by national courts would fall away.'3 ' As
Professor Harlow has put it, "[a]n effective and accessible justice system
is ... the way to provide the element of individual redress and reparation
and, where appropriate, sanction, which form essential components of
accountability systems.' 32 And although there "is no complete answer to
the old question: 'who will guard the guardians?,' ,133 the DSR-Senator
Lines Application before the ECtHR has demonstrated that (even EC)
judicial institutions are not themselves beyond control.
Long-standing reluctance, widespread among lOs, to abandon abso-
lute immunity before domestic courts, may be rightly perceived as a final
attempt to keep the judicial cat in the bag and, in doing so, maintain the
ensuing gap in legal accountability. However, the judicial discourse, at
both the domestic and international level, on the application of the doc-
trine of 1O immunity is bound to continue in the light of the irreversible
humanization of international law. Although one approach would consist
in an evolutionary interpretation of the rules on immunities,'34 prece-
dence should be given to the right of access to court because of its
inherent human rights component.
In comparison with bringing cases against lOs before domestic
courts, opening access to the ICJ for lOs as both applicants and respon-
dents would constitute a cogent tool for maintaining the coherence of the
international legal system. The removal of the procedural obstacle con-
stituted by Article 34 of the ICJ's Statute is just as pivotal in establishing
a comprehensive and adequate accountability regime for lOs as is the
refusal, in appropriate cases, of their jurisdictional immunity before do-
mestic courts.
If the Nineteenth century was a century of parliaments, and the
Twentieth was a century of governments, then the Twenty-first will be
129. Per Cramdr, Recent Swedish Experiences with Targeted UN Sanctions: The Erosion
of Trust in the Security Council, in REVIEW OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER STATES 105
(de Wet & Nollkaemper eds., 2003).
130. Erika de Wet & Andrd Nollkaemper, Review of Security Council Decisions by Na-
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that of courts and judges.'35 Widening access to the ICJ by way of
amending Article 34 of the court's statute so as to allow lOs to become
parties in cases before the court would undoubtedly constitute a major
step towards the envisaged role for the international judiciary. On the
level of domestic courts, activism in assessing the level of protection
provided by remedial mechanisms within 1Os and the consequential de-
nial of immunity in case of a negative outcome of such an assessment
would also enhance the role of the judiciary in closing the accountability
gap.
135. Georges Abi-Saab, Whither the Judicial Function? Concluding Remarks, in Bois-
SON DE CHAZOURNES, supra note 48, at 242 (summarizing a prediction made by Professor
Christian Dominicd).
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